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My Introduction to Politics

My first encounter of the political kind occurred in 1992, when a kindergarten classmate
asked me who my parents voted for. Based on some dinner conversations, which went mostly
over my head, I knew they voted for Bill Clinton. He told me his parents voted for Bush. At that
time, a "party" was something associated only with birthdays and I was unaware of the existence
of the word "ideology." I understood, however, that politics entails conflict. His parents voted for
someone different than my parents voted for: his parents lost and my parents won.
Over the next several years, my understanding of politics increased only by knowing that
my mother is a Democrat, my father is a Republican, Bill Clinton had an affair, my grandmother
yells at the Republicans on Meet the Press every Sunday morning, and she never voted for one in
all of her eighty-plus years. I did not !mow about the nature ofthe disagreements between the
two parties, but I knew the conflict is not so grave that you cannot be married to someone from
the opposing party; that some people, like my father, sometimes vote for candidates from the
opposing party; and others, like my grandmother, never vote for candidates from the opposing
party.
I attained political consciousness in eighth grade, during the 2000 election (not political
consciousness in the Marxian sense that I finally rejected my own subordination, but rather in the
sense that I finally had a rudimentary understanding the issues that the parties disagree about). A
social studies course required me to research candidates' positions on a litany issues for a mock
debate, in which I played AI Gore. A combination of newspaper articles and information on the
Internet (cettainly nothing like congressional roll call data) left me with the impressions that
Democratic politicians agree with one another on everything, Republican politicians agree with
one another on everything, and there is no consensus whatsoever between the two parties. During
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the debate, my opponent referred to himself and all of his policies, with pride, as "conservative"
and to myself and all of my policies, with disdain, as "liberal." My w1derstanding of politics
finally included an ideological element: Democratic elites support uniformly liberal policies and
Republican elites support unifotmly conservative policies.
Anecdotal evidence from interviews conducted with family members and friends
(certainly not a representative sample, like that of an academic public survey) indicated that the
masses behave similarly to elites. I found that although a significant minority of people does not
belong to any party and does not participate at all in politics, of the majority of people who
identify with a party, most agree with their party on nearly everything. I found that some of those
who identify with a party, however, disagree with their pruiy on a significant number of issues
and that Democrats are more likely than Republicans to belong in this category.
Elite behavior and most of the mass behavior seemed logical and inevitable to me. It
made sense that opposing parties are structured around opposing ideologies. I failed to
w1derstand why opposing gun control and opposing to the right to an abortion are part of the
same ideology (to me, the opposite made more sense) or why they are both "conservative"
positions, but people much smarter than me insisted they are, so I took these things for granted. I
wrote offthose instances where people stray from their party's ideology as anomalies. I viewed
partisanship and ideology as synonymous.
In my first university political science course- Political Behavior and Public Opinion,
which caused me to switch majors-! used the terms liberal and Democrat or conservative and
Republican interchangeably. My professor insisted that ideology and pruiisanship are differentthat although it is not the case today, there was a time when Congress contained liberal
Republicans and conservative Democrats and considerable ideological overlap existed between
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the parties. The elite behavior and most of the mass behavior that previously seemed logical and
inevitable was neither and perhaps those partisans I wrote off as anomalies were no such thing.
If elite Democrats and elite Republicans drifted apart ideologically over the past half
century, what happened to ideology in the electorate over that period? The first section of this
analysis addresses the connection between elite ideology and mass ideology. The second and
third sections address whether or not my anecdotal evidence reflects the current state of mass
ideology: is there an ideological gap between the two pruiies in the electorate and are
Republicans more ideologically homogenous than Democrats in the electorate?

Section 1: Elite-Mass Dynamics
It is theoretically possible that the masses obtain ideology independently of elites and that

elite ideology is entirely a function of mass ideology. One ofthe earliest explanations of the
interaction between elite ideology and mass ideology assumes exactly that-mass ideology is
exogenous. A model of spatial competition determines the pruiies' ideologies. Since the U.S. uses
a single-member district plurality voting system, which " literally pulverize[s] third parties," the
model assumes only two pruiies (Duverger 1973, p. 23). The model also follows in the classical
economic tradition and assumes that a voter is a rational actor, basing her vote entirely on
maximizing her payoff- in this case voting for the party that is located nearest to her on a twodimensional liberal-conservative spectrum . The Nash equilibrium outcome of this model is for
both pruties to position themselves in the exact same spot-the ideology corresponding to that of
the mediru1 voter (Downs 1957). Based on this finding, one reasonably expects the Democratic
and Republican Parties to be ideologically similar.
The assumption that voters are ideological, let alone that they acquire ideology
independently of elites, runs counter to the most influential work on public opinion of that time,
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The American Voter, and many others since. Campbell eta!. conduct a series of representative
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interviews to determine whether or not the liberal-conservative "notion" is widespread within the
electorate (1960, p. 217). Asking respondents open-ended questions about the respondents' likes
and dislikes about the two parties and the two presidential candidates at the time, they find that
only a very small portion of the mass public-less than 12 percent-thinks in constrained
ideological terms (Campbell et al. 1960). The Downsian model, nonetheless, gained popularity
because it was an elegant and accmate depiction of elite politics at the time, when the two
patiies' ideologies overlapped significantly.
As evidence of the ideological homogeneity between the two parties, one needs look no
further than the American Political Science Association's Committee on Political Patiies' report:
Toward a More Responsive Two-Party System. Scholars at the time considered the overlap
problematic because the "alternatives between the two pa1iies [were] defined so badly that it
[was] often difficult to determine what [an] election [had] decided in even the broadest terms"
(American Political Science Association 1950, pp. 3-4). BatTy Goldwater summat·ized the reality
of the "me too" politics of the mid-century best, with a campaign slogan offering "a choice, not
an echo."
Polarization
"Me too" politics is no longer with us. On the contrary, one of the dominant media
natTatives about American national politics over the last two decades is that politics is
increasingly polarized. Plenty of scholat·ship corroborates this mainstream media meme. The two
parties in Congress are becoming more ideologically homogenous internally and the distance
between the two parties is growing (Poole and Rosenthal 1997). Poole and Rosenthal (1997) use
NOMINATE scores of members' of Congress ideologies to quantify the polarization, but interest
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group ratings of members' of Congress voting records (Stonecash et al. 2003 ), and the
percentage of party-line roll call votes in a given Congress (Fleisher and Bond 2000) produce the
same picture.
Scholars disagree about the root cause of the polarization- they advance theories ranging
from economic polarization in the electorate (McCarty et al. 1997), to geographic self-selection
(Stonecash et al. 2003), to changes in congressional rules (Rohde 1991)-but most concede that
the realignment of the South plays a role. Goldwater did offer a choice in the 1964 presidential
election and, with his opposition to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, set in motion an exodus of
southern whites from the Democratic Party. Catmines and Stimson explain the realignment of the
South using the theory of conflict displacement (1989). They argue "most issues most of the time
lie dmmant, stining interest only in those especially informed or affected," and civil rights was
one of those issues until Goldwater's vote (1989, pp. 159- 160).
His vote was a " critical moment" because it was the first time that the titular heads of the
two parties took opposing stances on the issue of civil rights, making the issue salient (1989, p.
160). This new cleavage created cross-pressured members of Congress and cross-pressured
voters- those who have an allegiance to one party and a pressure to defect to, or at least vote
with, the other pa1iy, with whom they agree on this important issue. Southern Democratic elites
gave in to the latter pressure and joined the Republican Party and southern Democratic voters
eventually followed.
Unlike Downs' spatial model, Catmines ' and Stimson's theory of conflict displacement
predicts polarization. In order for a realigmnent to take place, elites have to make the new issue
the most prominent one, which requires them to downplay the importance of previous
disagreements between the parties. Thus, the conflict di splacement model only predicts
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polarization on one issue dimension, which means it fails to accurately describe the politics of
today. The parties are polarized on a whole host of issues: New Deal issues, which polarized
them during the Great Depression; racial issues, which polarized them during the 1960s; and
cultural issues, which polarized them after Roe v. Wade in 1973. Lee even finds polarization in
Congress on issues with no identifiable ideological content (2005).
Conflict Extension
When new issues with the potential to create cleavages arise-the most recent being
stem-cell research, gay rights issues, and foreign policy after the invasion of Iraq-the two
parties take polarized stances, but do not come to a consensus on former issues or downplay their
importance. The New Deal issues are just as polarizing and important as they have ever been.
Layman and Carsey term this polarization across multiple issue dimensions "conflict extension,"
as opposed to the "conflict displacement" theorized by Carmines and Stimson (Layman and
Carsey 2002). But how does conflict extension in Congress affect the mass public? Why have all
of these new issues with the potential to lead to a widespread realignment surfaced without
producing that realignment?
As Campbell et al. show, the mass publi c is not very ideologically sophisticated (1960). It
is not that the mass public is unqualified to think in constrained ideological terms, but there are
costs associated with doing so. Most people do not have enough time or are not interested
enough in politics to form a coherent ideological worldview and stay on top off current events,
fitting new issues into that matrix- they have to work and take care of their kids and they would
rather watch sports and go shopping.
Instead, the mass public commonly employs shmtcuts to reach opinions about politics.
Chief among those shortcuts is pattisanship. If you are a pattisan and a new issue emerges on the
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scene, like stem-cell research did in 2001 , an easy way to fmmulate a rational opinion on the
issue is to adopt the opinion of your party's elites. This is how Layman and Carsey explain the
lack of widespread realigmnent. They cite the longstanding concept, first proposed by Campbell
et al., that partisanship is at least as stable and enduring as ideology is (1960). Because of that,
Layman and Carsey propose that partisans are likely to just adopt their parties' positions on new
issues. The hypothesis is reinforced by highly-esteemed and more contemporary public opinion
scholarship, that the mass public is most likely to "receive and accept" new political cues from
elites with whom they already agree on other issues (Zaller 1992).
Although there is probably some truth to Downs' model and the idea that elite ideology is
affected by mass ideology through elections, it is largely insignificant compared to the effect of
elite ideology on mass ideology.
Section II: Polarization in Public

If political elites are polarized and the mass public receives its political cues from those
elites, would it not logically follow that the mass public is becoming more polarized, as my
anecdotal evidence led me to believe? Since Pat Buchanan announced "there is a religious war
going on in our country for the soul of America," in his speech at the 1992 Republican National
Convention, the idea that the mass public is also polarized has been conventional wisdom in the
mainstream media. The electoral maps in 2000 and 2004 fit this "culture war" frame perfectly
and a popular satirical map soon made its rounds on the Internet, summarizing the story nicely,
with the blue states labeled " The United States of Canada" and the red states labeled "Jesusland."
Unlike the case of elite polarization, the media does not have the facts squarely in their
comer on the subject of popular polarization. It remains a hotl y debated issue among scho lars.
Fiorina et al. argue that a closely divided nation is not necessarily a deeply divided nation and
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that most Americans are moderate, echoing Co;~e1~~~1 s assertion that most Americans "are not
very well-informed about politics and public affairs, do not care a great deal about politics, do
not hold many of their views very strongly, and are not very ideological" (Fiorina et al. 2005, p.
19). American National Election Studies (ANES) data supports their hypothesis. The biennial
survey asks voters to place themselves on an ideological scale from I (Extremely Liberal) to 7
(Extremely Conservative) and about half of the electorate either place themselves at 4
(Moderate) or are unable to place themselves on the scale. The distribution looks nothing like
that of Congress.
A few decades ago, scholars won ied that the parties were dying. In the 1970s, parties
were hardly the central entities organizing political behavior that they had been in the past. The
number of voters who identified themselves as Independents was as high as it had ever been, as
was the number of neutral voters-those who did not like or dislike anything in particular about
either party (Wattenburg 1984). Candidate-centered elections supplanted party-centered elections

and split-ticket voting approached 30 percent (Wattenburg 1984), but beginning about the same
time as elite polarization took off in the early 1990s, all of these trends began reversing
(Hetherington 2001 ). Today, party voting is as high as it was in 1950- its previous apex
(Abramowitz 2007).
This resurgence of partisanship causes other scholars to contend that polarization does
exist in the mass public and that it is increasing, specifically among partisans. Abramowitz does
not argue with Fiorina's et al. assertion that the aggregate ideology ofthe mass public is
relatively moderate and that it has changed very little in the last half century. He does, however,
find an increasing correlation between ideology and partisanship (Abramowitz 2007). The
average American citizen may be moderate, but the average American voter is much less likely
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to be moderate. And if that voter is a Democrat/Republican, the probability that she is to the
left/right of center on the ideological spectrum has increased remarkably, as has the probability
that she will vote for her party's nominee for President and Congress. If one looks at an
ideological distribution of Democratic and Republican midtetm voters, it looks strikingly similar
to the bimodal, polarized distribution of members' of Congress ideologies.
Jacobson reaches a similar conclusion by comparing partisans' approval ratings of
President Bush. Using Gallup tracking polls of President Bush's approval rating, Jacobson finds
that the average approval rating among Republicans is 88 percent and among Democrats it is 14
percent, which "makes Bush the most polarizing president on record by a wide margin"
(Abramowitz and Jacobson 2006, p. 90). Abramowitz and Jacobson think these findings are
worthy of being called polarization.
Fiorina et al. do not quarrel with their findings, but they do not consider the phenomenon
polarization. Abramowitz and Jacobson are willing to call it "partisan polarization": the parties
are becoming more internally ideologically homogenous and the ideological distance between
the parties is increasing. However, since patiisans are still largely not extremists-close to the
poles of the distribution- and "pole" is at the root of the term "polarization," Fiorina et al. prefer
to use the tenn "sorting" to avoid confusion.

Sorting
Whatever one chooses to call it, it is certainly happening. Using ANES data and
considering a voter smied if she places herself on the same side of the midpoint on the liberalconservative scale that her party is located on, Levendusky finds that less than 30 percent of
voters are sorted in 1972 and in 2004, over 45 percent are sorted (2009). These may seem like
low numbers in light of how polarized elite politics is, but keeping in mind how few voters think
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in ideological terms and how many classify the;;s·e·i;~s as "moderate" or are unable to classify
themselves, 45 percent is quite high.
To determine the cause of sorting, Levendusky employs the 1992-1996 ANES panel
study-a survey where the same respondents are asked questions dming three consecutive
election cycles, as opposed to the time-series studies, where respondents are only asked
questions during one election cycle. Using a multiple regression analysis, he finds the best
predictor of a respondent being sorted in 1994 is whether or not they are aware of elite
differences- they place the Democratic Party to the left of the Republican Party on the liberalconservative scale- in 1992.
As a robustness check and to prove causation, Levendusky conducts an experiment,
where subjects are briefed on an issue and then asked their opinion on the issue. One group is
told that the two parties' elites disagree very strongly on the issue; another is told that the two
parties' elites disagree, but not very strongly, on the issue; and the control group is not informed
about elite positions. Those in the first group are significantly more likely to be sorted than either
of the other groups. The results of both the multiple regression and the experiment reinforce the
conclusion of the previous section that elite ideology strongly influences mass ideology.
So What?

Sorting is happening, but what consequences does it bring? As a thought experiment,
imagine that only six voters remain in the country: three Democrats and three Republicans. They
decide to elect a new president using the method they are used to: closed partisan primary
elections and a general election between the two primary winners. Assume that all of the voters
are running, they cannot vote for themselves, and votes are detetmined solely by ideological
proximity. If the parties each contain one liberal, one conservative, and one moderate, the general

-.J,...._

Manter 11
'"-''

.......

election is going to be between a moderate Democrat and a moderate Republican. If, however,
the Democratic Pa1iy contains two liberals and one moderate and the Republican Party contains
two conservatives and one moderate, the election will be between a liberal Democrat and a
conservative Republican. Both scenarios have the same partisan and ideological distributions,
but the outcomes of the primary elections are dramatically different.
Sorting has consequences for general elections as well. Sorting provides part of the
answer for the recent shift from campaigns targeting swing voters to campaigns mobilizing the
base because "as the number of sorted voters becomes larger (and the size of the base increases),
the relative costs of the base and swing voter strategies shift-base voters become a potentially
more lucrative source ofvotes than swing voters" (Levendusky 2009, p. 129). If one party is
better sorted overall than the other, it can pursue a base-mobilization strategy to greater benefit,
but differences in issue-level sorting are also consequential. If one party is particularly better
sorted than another on a given issue, it provides the better sorted patiy with a profitable avenue
of appeal to cross-pressured pmiisans from the opposing side.
Sorting has several attitudinal effects on mass behavior as well. Levendusky finds that
so1ied voters are more likely to support their party at the ballot box, they evaluate their own pmiy
more positively and the other party more negatively, and they tend to agree with their parties on a
greater number of issues (2009). Having so1ied partisans is definitely in the interest of the two
parties because of the enormous consequences, but which party is better sorted?

Section III: Partisan Differences
Is my anecdotal evidence that Republicans are more ideologically homogeneous than
Democrats conect? Are Republicans better sorted? In an endnote, Levendusky mentions that, in
fact, they are (2009). Common wisdom validates his claim. The idea that Republicans march in
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lock-step, while Democrats march to the beat of their own drums is popular. Others may cite the
fact that the Democratic coalition varies more widely demographically and regionally as a reason
the Democrats are worse sorted.
Levendusky mentions that some of the difference in rates of sorting between Democrats
and Republicans " undoubtedly stem[s] at least in part from the different valence of the
ideological labels 'liberal' and 'conservative"' (2009, p. 156). He is referring to a well-known
paradox in American politics: people prefer liberal goverru11ent, but when asked whether they are
liberal or conservative, they have an overwhelming preference for the term conservative (Ellis
and Stimson, p. 2).
Conflicted Conservatives

Using the Public Policy Mood survey, Ellis and Stimson demonstrate that in every year
from 1970 to 2005, the American public is on the operationally liberal side of neutral, even in the
most extreme of conservative years like 1980, but there are almost double the numbers of selfidentified conservatives than there are self-identified liberals (Ellis and Stimson, p. 2). Looking
more closely at the responses of the self-identified conservatives, when issues are broken down
into "social welfare" and "traditional moral" dimensions, Ellis and Stimson find 21 percent are
operationally conservative on both dimensions, 30 percent are operationally conservative only on
the "traditional moral" dimension, 15 percent are operationally conservative on only the "social
welfare" dimension, and 34 percent are not operationally conservative on either dimension,
whom Ellis and Stimson dub "conflicted conservatives" (p. 7).
If a full third of self-identified conservatives are conflicted, compared to a mere four
percent of self-identified liberals that are conflicted, that should cetiainly explain a large part of
the difference in the rates of sorting between Democrats and Republicans, since Levendusky's
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sorting rates? Levendusky also looks at rates of sorting on specific issues. He does not, however,
separate Democrats and Republicans on those issues.
Are Republicans better sorted on the issues? It would not be surprising if Republicans are
better sorted, but they are by no means as well sorted as the generic liberal-conservative selfidentification measure of smiing would lead one to believe. Levendusky finds that smiing is
highly correlated with both education and political knowledge, which Republicans have more of
(2009). In addition, the Republican coalition is more homogenous with respect to demographic
variables, like income and race.
Analyses of the aggregate party ideology have been conducted before. Abramowitz, using
the Cooperative Congressional Election Study, creates a measure of ideology by indexing
responses to 12 questions. " Democratic House voters had an average score of28 percent
conservative on the scale while Republican House voters had an average score of 70 percent
conservative" (Abramowitz 2007, p. 11 ). One might assume that this means Democrats are better
sorted than Republicans, as the average Democrat is closer to her respective ideological pole.
These indexed measures of aggregate partisan ideology, however, reveal nothing about rates of
sorting. It could be that Republicans are better sotied (more likely to be on the right side of
center), but the Democrats who are sorted are significantly more ideologically extreme. In
addition, the creation of indexes does not allow us to analyze rates of sorting on an issue by issue
basis.
Data

This analysis employs the same ANES survey data (from 1972-2004) as Levendusky's
analysis, but it also includes data from 2008, which was unavailable for his analysis. For
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questions where respondents are asked to place themselves on a scale, Levendusky's definition
of sorted is used: a respondent is considered sorted on an issue if she places herself on the same
side of the midpoint that her party is located on. For questions where respondents are asked
whether they favor or oppose a policy, a respondent is considered sorted if she agrees with her
party's position. Independent identifiers who lean toward a party are counted as patiisans, as they
behave like weak partisans (Keith et al. 1992)
Several questions asking respondents to place themselves on a scale have been asked in
the same format for decades. Questions about liberal-conservative self-i dentification, aid to
minorities, guaranteed jobs, and health insurance have been asked since 1972; questi ons about
defense spending and ab01iion have been asked since 1980, and a question about government
services has been asked since 1982 (although not all were asked in every survey). These
questions allow for analysis of intertemporal variation in sorting.
In addition to those seven questions, 13 additional questions are included from the 2008
survey to provide a more complete picture about the current state of sotiing. These questions
cover a variety of relevant social welfare, moral, and foreign policy issues. These questions,
however, will not allow for comparisons across time, as they have not been asked every year.
Results and Analysis

Levendusky is correct that, in terms of ideological self-placement, Republ icans are better
sorted than Democrats. Both patiies are currently better sorted than they were at the begitming of
the time-series, but Republicans have increased the margin from 16 percentage points in 1972 to
nearly 20 points in 2004 and over 31 points in 2008. The large decline in liberal identification in
2008, however, may end up being a blip in the data. Because nearly a third of conservatives are
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confl icted, one would assume Republican edges i;;'sorting anywhere from 14 to 20 percent in the
rest of the issues.
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Among the other six questions asked over time, the single largest margin is on the aid to
minorities question. The gap is less than 15 percentage points in 1972 (about where the
ideological self-identification question would lead one to believe), but it grows to nearly 50
percentage points in 2008. This is the only issue where one party is consistently trends upward
and the other consistently trends downward. When the parties move in opposite directions on
rates of sorting, it is not a polarization effect, where the parties are moving apart ideologically,
but rather a mainstream effect, where they are moving closer together ideologically. In every
year but 1990-1994, where there is little movement on the issue, the two parties move in the
same direction ideologically.
It should be noted that, like many other analyses, only the answers of white respondents

are included as data. In a shoti section on the variance in sorting across issues, Levendusky
mentions that changes in the meaning of questions over time, with aid to minorities increasingly
associated with "unpopular welfare programs," may be responsible for the growing gap on this
question (2009, p. 52).
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The only issue, other than aid to minorities, where Republicans are consistently better
sorted than Democrats is on guaranteed jobs. Unlike aid to minorities though, both parties are
becoming more sorted over time. Democrats move from 34 to 44 percent sorted and Republicans
move from 49 to 64 percent sorted over the time-series. Although the overall trend is an increase
in sorting, the year-to-year variation is similar to that of aid to minorities because of the
mainstream effect. The parties move in opposite directions on the graph (the same direction
ideologically) in all of the 17 years except 1976, 1994, and 2008 and the changes in those three
years are three ofthe least significant, in te1ms of magnitude, shifts in the series.
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The only issue where Democrats are consistently better sorted than Republicans is on
abortion. Once again, both parties are better sorted at the end of the time-series than at the
beginning. The trend is more stable than that of guaranteed jobs, mainstream effects are not
noticeable, and both parties increase their level of sorting virtuall y equally. A gap of 11 points in
1980 is a gap of 12 points in 2008.
The abortion question is slightly different than the other six questions. Instead of a sevenpoint scale with a midpoint, the abortion scale only has four points. The responses considered on
the Republican side are that " by law, abmtion should never be pennitted" and "the law should
only permit abortion in the case of rape, incest, or when the woman's life is in danger. " The
points considered on the Democratic side are that "the law should permit abmtions for reasons
other than rape, incest, or danger to the woman's life, but only after the need for an abortion has
been clearly established" and "by law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a
matter of personal choice." If one considers the Republican position to only the first option and
the Democratic position to only include the last option, the trends look very similar, but
obviously both parties are less sorted.
-------
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The remaining three issues are less clear than the previous ones. Neither party is better
sorted in every year on any of the issues. The issue with the narrowest margin is health
insurance. Both parties' levels of sorting are relatively stable until 1992, when there is a
Democratic uptick, probably caused by Bill Clinton's focus on it during the election. In 1994,
however, there is a mainstream effect in response to "Hillarycare," where both parties become
more conservative on the issue. Since then, the mainstream effect has continued, with
Republican opposition to government health care decreasing slightl y and Democratic suppmi
increasing slightly to a five or six point lead in 2004 and 2008.
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The issue of government services produces more volatile gaps. It is no surprise that
Republicans are better sorted in the peak conservative years of this scale, like the beginning of
the Reagan administration and during the Republican Revolution of the early 1990s. The most
impmiant fact, however, is that this is the issue where the mainstream effect is strongest. The two
parties move in the same ideological direction on services in all 12 years that the question is
asked. There seems to be a cyclical aspect to this question. Democrats are much better sorted in
2008 than they are in 1982, but I suspect they are not much better sorted in 2010 than they are in
1984.
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Defense spending is clearly the most volatile issue, where the parties jump from just over
10 percent sorted to almost 50 percent sorted and over 70 percent sorted to nearly 20 percent
sorted, respectively. No other issue has that kind of volatility because no other issue has the
urgency of defense spending. Once again, the differences in rates of sorting are the result of
mainstream effects and not polarization effects. As the Cold War is ending, Republicans become
less sorted and Democrats become more sorted because the public, on average, wants to spend
less on defense. The mainstream effect we see in 2000 is probably the result of the U.S. embassy
bombings and the bombing of the USS Cole- the begi!U1ings ofthe War on Tenor. One could
expect to see a continuation of the mainstream effect due to 9/11 if the survey asked about
defense spending in 2002. From 2004 to 2008, we see a mainstream effect in the opposite
direction as fatigue with the wars increases among both parties.
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The over-time issues leave a cloudy picture. There has been a larger increase in the
preference for the term "conservative" than for the tenn "liberal," but both parties are becoming
better sorted on that question. Both parties are moving in the same ideological direction on the
aid to minorities issue. Other than defense, which none of the other issues have the urgency of
and which seems largely nonpartisan, none of the other issues come close to the 20 to 30
percentage point gap produced for the Republicans by the liberal-conservative question.
The Republicans are not even better sorted on most of the remaining issues. Both parties
are becoming better sorted on guaranteed jobs, abortion, and health insurance. Republicans have
a pretty wide lead on the first item, the Democrats have a less wide lead on the second, and the
third is pretty much a coin flip . In 2008, Democrats are more sorted and Republicans are less
sorted on the issue of government services than they were in 1972. The mass public, however,
unlike in the case of the aid to minorities issue, is not trending consistently in one direction. The
issue of government services has a cyclical aspect to it.
Not only could the liberal-conservative self-identification question be misleading because
it inflates a slim Republican edge in sorting, it is possible that it disguises an actual Democratic
edge in sorting. To get a broader picture of sorting today, all of the issue-based questions from

!:.
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2008, where voters could clearly be identified as sorted and not sorted, are included in the table
below:
Percentage of
Republicans
Sorted

Percentage of
Democrats
Sorted

Republican
advantage

Social welfare issues
Aid to minorities
Guaranteed jobs
Privatization of Social Security
Health insurance
Government services
Prescription drug coverage for seniors

70
64
67
51
42
17

20
44
60
56
55

50
20
7
-5
-13

94

-77

Moral issues
Death penalty
Gay adoption
Abortion
Gay marriage/civil unions
Gays in the military

80
62
51
43
26

44
55
62
66
81

36
7
-11
-23
-55

Defense issues
Defense spending
Invasion of Iraq
Deadline for withdrawal from Iraq
Torture of suspected terrorists

54
66
62
48

34
79
81

20
-13
-19
-29

Other issues
Gun control
Immigration
Higher emissions standards
Higher fuel standards

62
47
22
13

59
68

77

77

95

3
-21
-55
-82

Of the 19 issues, Republicans are better sotied on seven. The most advantageous
characterization for Republicans would be to exclude the four most overwhelmingly popular
Democratic positions-prescription drug coverage for seniors, which was passed by a
Republican President; allowing gays to serve openly in the military; higher emissions standards;
and higher fuel standards-as well as the question about torture of suspected terrorists (because
respondents could consider enhanced interrogation techniques separate from "torture"), and to
combine the two Iraq-related issues into only one favorable issue for the Democrats.
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The leaves Republicans better sorted on aidto minorities, guaranteed jobs, privatization
of social security, the death penalty, gay adoption, defense spending, and gun control (if "keep
laws about the same" is counted as sorted for Republicans) and Democrats better sorted on
health insurance, government services, abortion, gay marriage (if support of civil unions is
counted as sorted for Republicans), Iraq, and immigration. The Republicans are sorted on seven
of 13 issues, a naiTow majority, and the least relevant issue to today's politics-the death
penalty-is one of the issues included.
Claiming a significant difference in sm1ing for Republicans is difficult. Especially
because the partisan gap in 2008 was its highest in a decade, with 51 percent of voters
identifying as Democrats and 37 percent identifying as Republicans. It is not as if the
Republicans' levels of sorting are deflated by Independent leaners. At best, the parties are quite
equally well sorted and the data could possibly indicate that Democrats are better sot1ed. Of
course, that could all have changed by now, but probably not by much. It seems that neither party
enj oys the spoils that come with having a better sorted party like the advantage in basemobilization, the greater number of wedge-issue possibilities, or the advantage in loyalty.

Conclusion
The connection between elite ideology and mass ideology is clear: elite ideology has an
overwhelming influence on mass ideology. My anecdotal evidence from interviews with family
and friends exaggerates the sophistication of the mass public, the ideological gap between the
parti es in the electorate, and the Republ ican edge in ideological homogeneity. As elites became
increasingly polarized over the past half-century, partisans have not polarized in a similar fashion
because they are not sophisticated enough conceptually. Instead of becoming more extreme,
partisans have become better sorted. It is difficult to distinguish which party, if any, is better

·.
sorted. The two parties seem equally equipped
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to t~'e advantage of the possibilities that sorting

brings. Sorting is likely to slow its pace because elites cannot become much more polarized and
there is an upper bound to sorting because of the number of citizens who are politically
uninvolved. Overall, the electorate is quite balanced, which the recent swings in Congressional
control reflect.
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